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NOTES

Congress’ Preliminary Response to the
Abu Ghraib Prison Abuses
ROOM FOR REFORM?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 22, 2004, Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ)
introduced a bill in response to the prisoner abuses
photographed at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. 1
Divided into three parts, the bill directs the President to
require: (1) the videotaping of interrogations and “other
pertinent interactions” of detainees in the custody of the
United States armed forces as well as intelligence operatives
and contractors of the United States; 2 (2) “unfettered access” to
detainees in the custody of the United States by members of
various international human rights organizations; 3 and (3) the
developing of guidelines by the Judge Advocate General to
ensure that the required videotaping in “section 1 is
1
H.R. 4951, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) [hereinafter Interrogation Bill].
Representative Holt reintroduced the Interrogation Bill to Congress on January 4,
2005, stating that “Congress failed to do [its] job, doggedly investigate how and why
[the Abu Ghraib prison] abuses occurred, and put in place new safeguards for
interrogations in U.S. military detention facilities . . . .” 151 CONG. REC. E15 (daily ed.
Jan. 4, 2005) (statement of Rep. Holt).
2
Specifically, the bill orders the President to act “[i]n accordance with the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment” and “the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States” when implementing a specific videotaping plan.
Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 1(a). In addition, the bill also requires that
“[v]ideotapes shall be made available . . . to both prosecution and defense to the extent
they are material to any military or civilian criminal proceeding.” Id. § 1(b).
3
The human rights organizations mentioned in the bill are The
International Federation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red
Crescent, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and The United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture. Id. § 2.
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sufficiently expansive to prevent any abuse of detainees” that
violates “law binding on the United States, including
[international] treaties . . . .” 4
Three formal reports evaluate the allegations of abuse
at Abu Ghraib. 5 The Taguba Report, commissioned by the
United States Army and written by Major General Antonio
Taguba, has been available to the public since May 2, 2004,
despite the fact that it was initially marked SECRET/NO
The Schlesinger Report,
FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. 6
researched and written by an independent panel commissioned
by the government, was released to the public on August 24,
2004. 7 Finally, the Jones-Fay Army Report, commissioned by
the United States Army and compiled by Lieutenant General
Anthony R. Jones and Major General George R. Fay, was
declassified and released to the public on August 25, 2004. 8
While the Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones-Fay Reports
evaluate allegations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib
4

Id. § 3(a).
Although a series of reports address the instances of abuse at Abu Ghraib,
it appears that Representative Holt lends a tremendous amount of credence to three of
them. See 151 CONG. REC. E15, supra note 1 (stating that “[l]ast year, three reports
that were compiled by U.S. Army officers and the bipartisan investigative commission
appointed by U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld documented in horrifying detail the
egregious human rights abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib Prison . . . .”). From
Representative Holt’s description of these reports, it can be inferred that he was
referencing the Taguba Report, the Schlesinger Report and the Jones-Fay Report
discussed in greater detail above. Accordingly, this paper will refrain from engaging in
a lengthy discussion of additional released reports and instead rely on the
aforementioned three reports’ findings. For a list of Abu Ghraib investigative reports
completed or underway as of August 23 2004, see http://www.cbc.ca/
news/background/iraq/prisonabuse_inquiries.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (follow
hyperlinks for specific reports).
6
ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE 1 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/taguba_report.pdf. General Sanchez of
the United States Army appointed Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba to write the report on
January 31, 2004 after the International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter
ICRC] planned to submit a twenty-four page written report to the United States
detailing abuses to Abu Ghraib detainees by members of the United States military
intelligence personnel. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, 98
AM. J. INT’L. L. 591, 594 (2004).
7
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO
REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER REPORT],
available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/schlesingerreport20040824.pdf.
8
GEORGE R. FAY & ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE [hereinafter JONES-FAY
REPORT], available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/fay_report20040825.pdf.
The Jones-Fay Report is actually a compilation of two separate reports. For
clarification purposes, citations to the Jones-Fay Report will be followed by “Part I” or
“Part II.” Part I refers to Jones’ report while Part II refers to Fay’s report.
5
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detention facility, each report investigates the problem from a
different angle. The Taguba Report explores the effectiveness
of the 800th Military Police Brigade’s 9 detention procedures at
the prison. 10 The Jones-Fay Report assesses whether members
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 11 “requested,
encouraged, condoned, or solicited [800th Military Police
Brigade] personnel to abuse detainees” and whether Military
Intelligence
personnel
“comported
with
established
interrogation
procedures
and
applicable
laws
and
regulations.” 12 Finally, the Schlesinger Report provides a
general analysis of what factors resulted in detainee
operational and interrogation difficulties at Abu Ghraib and
what corrective measures can be taken to remedy the
problem. 13
Each of the reports make two consistent findings. First,
Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel stationed at
Abu Ghraib lacked extensive training in the Geneva
Conventions. 14 Second, confusion existed among Military Police
and Military Intelligence personnel as to how to apply the
Geneva Conventions to the War in Iraq. 15 The reports’ findings
9
The 800th Military Police Brigade, based in Uniondale, New York, was
responsible for running the Abu Ghraib prison. Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at
593.
10
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, para. 3. Specifically, the Taguba
Report “[i]nvestigate[s] the training, standards, employment, command policies,
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade . . . .” Id. at 7, ¶
3(c).
11
The 205th Military Intelligence Brigade screened and interrogated
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison. JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (Part I).
12
Id. at 4 (Part II).
13
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
14
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 114 (Part II) (“Interrogator
training in the Laws of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions is ineffective.”);
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 44 (Director of the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib “failed to properly train and control his soldiers and
failed to ensure prisoners were afforded the protections under the relevant Geneva
Conventions.”); TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20 (Military Police personnel
received “very little instruction or training . . . on the . . . Geneva Convention[s]” and
“few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to [Military
Police] personnel or detainees.”).
15
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (Part II) (“Soldiers on the
ground are confused about how they apply the Geneva Conventions and whether they
have a duty to report violations of the conventions.”); SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note
7, at 82 (While the senior leadership at Abu Ghraib understood that the Geneva
Conventions applied “[t]he message in the field, or the assumptions made in the field,
at times lost sight of this underpinning.”); TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 44 (The
Commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade failed to ensure that her soldiers
“knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.”).
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and recommendations suggest that while some of the Military
Police and Military Intelligence personnel stationed at Abu
Ghraib intentionally committed sexual abuses and caused
bodily harm to prison detainees for sadistic purposes, a large
number of the abuses resulted from “misinterpretations of law
or policy or resulted from confusion about what interrogation
techniques were permitted by law . . . .” 16 The abuses at Abu
Ghraib cannot be attributed solely to the actions “of a few
bad[ ]apple[s]” 17 who chose not to abide by standard military
procedures. Rather, they must also be viewed as the product of
numerous Executive Branch and military policy errors that
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill fails to fully address.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks, the
Bush administration “attempted to build on precedents
established during past wars to support extraordinarily broad
claims of executive power.” 18 President Bush employed his
Commander-in-Chief authority to suspend the application of
the Geneva Conventions to suspected al Qaeda and Taliban
members detained in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 19 In addition, the Bush administration authorized the
use of coercive interrogation methods that arguably violated
general humanitarian principles as well as specific Geneva
Conventions provisions. 20
Unlike in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush
administration currently insists that most prisoners 21 detained
16
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (Part I). See also SCHLESINGER
REPORT, supra note 7, at 68.
17
John Barry, et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, May 24, 2004,
at ¶ 2, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/site/newsweek.
18
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 100 (2004).
19
See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU
GHRAIB 17-18 (2004). See infra Part III.A.
20
See Mark A. Drumbl, Symposium, ‘Terrorism on Trial’: Lesser Evils in the
War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 337 (2004) (finding that “[m]any
experts agree that the detentions, as well as interrogation methods deployed against
the detainees [in Guantanamo Bay], run afoul of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law.”); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and
Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 824 (2005) (arguing that the Bush
administration’s authorization of severe interrogation tactics in Afghanistan was
illegal and violated “Geneva law and nonderogable human rights.”); See infra Part
III.B.
21
See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Rights of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A6 (stating that “[a] new legal opinion by the Bush
administration has concluded for the first time that some non-Iraqi prisoners captured
by American forces in Iraq are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva
Conventions . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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in Iraq should be afforded full protection under the Geneva
Irrespective of the Executive Branch’s
Conventions. 22
contention on this matter, President Bush’s failure to initially
outline a clear Geneva Conventions policy in Iraq facilitated
the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib. 23 The Bush administration
assumed that all military personnel understood that the
Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq. 24 However, in light of the
Executive Branch’s self-proclaimed “war on terror” and the
suspension of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo Bay, this assumption appears to be unfounded. 25
As written, the Interrogation Bill serves as a superficial
response to a complex problem.
While it succeeds in
establishing deterrent measures that will assist in reducing
individual instances of abuse, 26 it misses the mark in
addressing the Executive Branch’s policy errors that
contributed to widespread detainee mistreatment. Instead of
relying solely on reactive methods to prevent another Abu
Ghraib atrocity, Congress must require the President to clearly
articulate whether and how the Geneva Conventions apply at
the onset of every military crisis. The Bush Administration’s
decision to withhold Geneva Conventions protections to al
Qaeda prisoners effectively eradicated the pre-9/11
presumption that the treaty’s provisions apply to all captured
22

U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media
Availability Enroute to Baghdad (May 13, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2004/tr20040513-secdef0749.html (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld as saying
Geneva Conventions “III and IV apply for the Iraqi prisoners of war and apply to the
civilian non-military detainees. That has been the case from the beginning.”). But cf.
REED BRODY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 7 (June 2004),
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf (“On May 5, 2004,
[Secretary Rumsfeld] told a television interviewer the Geneva Conventions ‘did not
apply precisely’ in Iraq but were ‘basic rules’ for handling prisoners.”) (quoting United
States Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with
Matt Lauer, NBC “The Today Show,” (May 5, 2004), http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/
2004/tr20040505-secdef1425.html).
23
See infra Part IV.B.ii.a.
24
See HERSH, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales as saying that “President [Bush] had ‘made no formal determination’
invoking the Geneva Conventions before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq . . . ‘because
it was automatic that Geneva would apply’ and it was assumed that the military
commanders in the field would ensure that their interrogation policies complied with
the President’s stated view.”).
25
In fact, President Bush’s suspension of the Geneva Conventions in
Afghanistan and Cuba led some military personnel stationed in Iraq to believe that
their detainees need not be afforded treaty protections. Paust, supra note 20, at 849.
26
The Interrogation Bill’s videotape requirement and unfettered access
requirement are examples of such deterrent measures. See generally Interrogation
Bill, supra note 1.
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detainees. 27 Moreover, if the President seeks to violate the
Geneva Conventions during a military campaign, he may only
do so with the Legislative Branch’s express approval. 28
This Note challenges Congress’ proposed response to the
Abu Ghraib prison atrocity. Part II begins with a general
description of the Geneva Conventions and other laws and
international treaties signed and ratified by the United States
to protect individuals held in U.S. custody from inhumane
treatment. Part III traces the evolution of United States Army
interrogation techniques from the period immediately
preceding September 11, 2001 to the present.
Part IV
discusses the specific types of torture endured by detainees
housed at the Abu Ghraib detention facility and also analyzes
the Executive Branch mistakes that caused these abuses. Part
V argues that Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill does not
adequately address the underlying policy problems confronting
the United States Army with regard to interrogation tactics
and detention procedures in Iraq. Finally, this Note concludes
by proposing and evaluating a substitute bill that will reduce
the number of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib and other
detention facilities by eradicating misinterpretations of law
and policy within the military.
II.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW

A number of international laws and conventions seek to
mitigate or prevent abuses during war by advancing the jus in
In general,
bello, or “the rightful manner of war.” 29
international humanitarian law prohibits “unnecessary
suffering” 30 and “set[s] [specific] limits on how war may be
waged.” 31 Indeed, the United States is a party to the Geneva
Conventions which, among other things, regulate the
treatment of prisoners of war (“POWs”) by banning the practice
27

See infra IV.B.ii.a.
See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 154 (arguing “that the Constitution is
best interpreted to require the President to obtain congressional approval, in the form
of legislation, if he wants to violate a treaty provision that is the law of the land.”).
29
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (3d ed.
1999). See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 108.
30
JANIS, supra note 29, at 180. See also WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 311 (2d ed. 1991).
31
See Randall P. Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the
Relationship?, at 49 (Aug. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/355.
28
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of torture. 32
Although there are four different Geneva
Conventions that the United States signed in 1949 and
supplemented with two protocols in 1977, this Note will focus
on Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
The international community’s
War (“Convention III”). 33
prohibition on torture is more generally stated in the
Convention Against Torture 34 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 35 additional treaties to which the
United States is also a party. 36 However, two primary issues
arising out of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal are whether all
Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel knew that
Convention III applied to soldiers captured and detained in
Iraq and whether they fully understood the content of the
treaty’s articles. Accordingly, this section explores the general

32

See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 108-10.
Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay:
Humanitarian and Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM.
RTS. BR. 6, 6 (2002). The other three conventions are Convention I for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Convention II
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea and Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War. Id.
34
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
33

[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec.10, 1984, art. 1, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
35
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.” International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 76, I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
36
Domestically, the United States enacted a law that criminalizes the
commission of torture by U.S. citizens on foreign soil. The United States Code defines
torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or
physical control.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The penalty for the commission or attempted
commission of torture by a U.S. citizen on foreign soil is no more than twenty years’
imprisonment. However, if torture results in the death of one or more individuals, the
crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. The United
States also enacted the War Crimes Act that criminalizes the violation of the Geneva
Conventions and other treaties that govern the laws of war. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
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provisions of Convention III rather than other international
treaties that espouse similar principles.
A.

Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War

Convention III confers POW status on captured
individuals who are military personnel of a party involved in
an armed conflict between one or more states. 37 A “de facto
state of armed conflict” as opposed to a formal declaration of
war is enough to trigger Convention III protections. 38 Both
states remain bound to the Convention even if one of the
warring states is not an official party to the treaty. 39 In
addition to armed conflict between states, Convention III also
applies in non-international conflicts, including civil wars and
other instances in which one or both of the warring parties are
not official states. 40
Convention III delineates “modest but important
humanitarian guarantees” 41 for POWs, some of which pertain
to interrogation tactics. Specifically, Convention III requires
that all POWs “must . . . be humanely treated” 42 and that they
“are entitled . . . to respect for their persons and their
“[O]utrages upon personal dignity,” including
honour.” 43
torture, mutilation or any other form of degrading treatment,
are strictly prohibited. 44 POWs must be afforded the right to
attend religious services of their faith provided that they are
not proven to have disciplinary problems. 45 In addition, their
housing conditions are to be “as favourable as those for
the . . . Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area.” 46
In terms of interrogation tactics, the Convention explicitly
37

See Chlopak, supra note 33, at 8.
See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 109.
39
Id.
40
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Human Rights
Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation of Detainees, 59 THE RECORD
271, 275-76 (2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Standards]. Only article 3, as opposed
to “the full protection of [Convention III], applies to non-international armed conflicts.”
Id. See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 110.
41
Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 110.
42
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III].
43
Id. art. 14.
44
Id. art. 3.
45
Id. art. 34.
46
Id. art. 25.
38
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prohibits “physical or mental torture, [and] any other form of
coercion” for the purpose of procuring intelligence
information. 47 POWs are only required to disclose their first
names, rank, army serial number and date of birth to detaining
officials. 48 Those prisoners who choose not to answer questions
beyond that cannot be “threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” 49
B.

Implementation and Enforcement

The Geneva Conventions’ primary purpose is to make
“human rights binding law.” 50 While Convention III clearly
identifies what protections should be afforded to POWs who are
taken into custody during an armed conflict, problems can
arise in implementing and enforcing its provisions. 51 United
Nations agencies or their subcommittees are primarily
responsible for ensuring that signatories to a treaty uphold
However,
their promises to respect human rights. 52
enforcement can become burdensome because, among other
reasons, United Nations agencies are not authorized to punish
treaty violators. 53
Independent, nonpolitical institutions interested in
preventing international humanitarian rights violations
confront similar problems. For example, the International
Committee of the Red Cross’ (“ICRC”) 54 inspections of the Abu
Ghraib detention facility revealed inhumane prisoner abuses. 55
Instead of remedying the problems discovered, ICRC agents’
recourse was limited to submitting a report to the United

47

Id. art. 17.
Convention III, art. 17.
49
Id.
50
LEVI, supra note 30, at 311.
51
See id. at 183 (arguing that the implementation and enforcement of human
rights protections in international treaties can be difficult).
52
See id.
53
See id. at 184.
54
The ICRC is “an independent, neutral organization” designed to ensure
“humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence[.]”. See
generally ICRC Homepage, http://www.icrc.org/eng (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
55
See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)
ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER
PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST,
INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION 3 (2004), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/
lweb/indiv/usgd/hotdocs.html (follow “Report of the International Committee of the Red
Cross” hyperlink) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT].
48
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States government that explained their committee’s findings. 56
The process of conducting the inspections, writing the report
and waiting for the United States government to respond took
almost a full year and enabled the cycle of abuse to continue at
Abu Ghraib. 57 In order to circumvent damaging bureaucratic
delays, Congress must act preemptively and pass laws that
identify and address the fundamental causes of prisoner abuse
abroad. Although a solid attempt, the Interrogation Bill does
not correct the underlying policy problems that existed at the
Abu Ghraib detention facility; it merely restates a failed
proposition. 58 This Note recommends a more effective bill in
Part V.
III.

EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States
drastically altered the Bush administration’s willingness to
adhere to preexisting international law. 59 Cofer Black, the
former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s
counterterrorism unit, testified before Congress in early 2002
that “[t]here was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11” and that
“[a]fter 9/11 the gloves came off.” 60 Prior to the al Qaeda
attacks, the United States Military applied the Geneva
Conventions “broadly” and provided protection to all

56

See Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 594 (explaining that “[f]rom the
start of the occupation of Iraq, representatives of the [ICRC] were allowed access to
Iraqi detainees . . . and . . . regularly submitted observations and recommendations to
the coalition forces regarding the treatment of such detainees.”).
57
The ICRC conducted inspections between March and November 2003.
ICRC REPORT, supra note 55, at 3. The United States government received a copy of
the report in February 2004. Id. at 1.
58
The Interrogation Bill provides that various agencies be “immediately
granted unfettered access to detainees or prisoners in the custody or under the effective
control of the armed forces of the United States.” Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 2.
As noted earlier, however, the ICRC’s “unfettered access” to the Abu Ghraib prison did
not succeed in ending the cycle of abuse. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
59
BRODY, supra note 22, at 1. President Bush embraced White House
Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales’ argument that “the ‘nature of the new war’ on
terrorism places such a premium on getting information from captured terrorists
quickly, that ‘[t]his new paradigm’ makes the restrictions of [Convention
III] . . . ‘obsolete.’” Barry C. Scheck, The ‘New Paradigm’ and Our Civil Liberties,” 28AUG CHAMPION 4 (Aug. 2004). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
337, 350 (finding that the “recent horrors at Abu Ghraib” demonstrate the Bush
administration’s “strategy of condoning wide-scale departures from traditional
prisoner-of-war protections.”).
60
Barry, supra note 17, at ¶ 3.
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individuals captured in an international armed conflict. 61 In
accordance with the United States Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, 62 the Geneva Conventions achieved the status of
“supreme federal law” and could not be undermined or ignored
unless one of two things occurred: (1) a particular Geneva
Convention treaty provision “exceed[ed] the scope of the treatymakers’ domestic lawmaking powers”; or (2) “a subsequent
inconsistent treaty or statute supersede[d] the [Geneva
Convention] treaty provision at issue.” 63 Prior to the terrorist
attacks, the government did not seek to undercut the United
States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions because, up
until that point, the treaty did not interfere with any foreign
engagement or military campaign. 64
In early 2002, however, President Bush concluded that
terrorism could not be fought by strictly adhering to
international rules of law. 65 Officials from the White House,
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice
drafted a number of memoranda concerning the application of
the Geneva Conventions to the War in Afghanistan and the
implementation of interrogation policies for use on al Qaeda
and Taliban detainees. 66 According to White House Counsel
Judge Alberto Gonzales, the documents “explore[d] the limits of
the legal landscape as to what the Executive Branch can do
within the law and the Constitution as an abstract matter.” 67
61

BRODY, supra note 22, at 5.
The Supremacy Clause states that “all Treaties made . . . under the
Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST.
art. 6.
63
Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 123-24.
64
In fact, on October 1, 1997, the government codified the Geneva
Conventions in an Army Regulation handbook [Army Regulation 190-8], which
established policies and procedures “‘for the administration, treatment, employment,
and compensation of enemy prisoners of war . . . .’” Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at
125 (quoting U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR,
RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES §1-1(a) (1997)).
This handbook cited the Geneva Conventions as “directly binding on all U.S. military
forces as a matter of . . . law, even where they conflict with the military’s own
regulations.” Id.
65
David J. Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449,
453 (2005) (The Bush Administration “fairly quickly decided that the threat it was
facing was entirely unprecedented. Existing treaties were seen as impediments to be
overcome. Concerned with the need to acquire as much ‘actionable intelligence’ as
possible, by whatever means, the Administration adopted a strategy to permit
something close to unfettered power in dealing with terrorist suspects.”).
66
See BRODY, supra note 22, at 5-6. See also Neil MacMmaster, Torture:
from Algiers to Abu Ghraib, 46 RACE & CLASS 1, 17-18 (2004).
67
Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales, Dep’t of
Def. Gen. Counsel William Haynes, Dep’t of Def. Deputy Gen. Counsel Daniel Dell’Orto
62
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After reviewing the parties’ arguments, President Bush
determined that terrorists or suspected terrorists would be
deemed “unlawful combatants” and denied protections under
Convention III. 68 President Bush provided leeway for the
implementation of harsh interrogation policies by holding that
unlawful combatants should be treated in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions but that “military necessity”
The Bush
ultimately dictates detainee treatment. 69
administration’s unwillingness to offer full Convention III
protections to terrorists coupled with its hesitancy to
completely ignore established international law resulted in the
breakdown of a clear Geneva Conventions policy in Iraq,
including the Abu Ghraib detention facility. 70
A.

Applicability of Geneva Convention III to the War in
Afghanistan

Legal memoranda 71 written by White House Counsel,
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice
influenced President Bush’s decision not to apply Convention
III to Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners. In a document dated
January 22, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee
expressed the view that al Qaeda is “not a nation-State” 72 or
and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Gen. Keith Alexander (June 22, 2004)
(transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html
[hereinafter Press Briefing].
68
See Barry, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.
69
Memorandum from President Bush to the Vice President, et al. 2 (Feb. 7,
2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164
(follow “Feb 7, 2002 – Memo from President Bush” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bush
Memorandum].
70
See Drumbl, supra note 20, at 339-40 (Finding that “[t]here is cause to
believe that [the] memoranda [pertaining to the War in Afghanistan], along with other
deliberate decisions made at senior levels to circumscribe the role of law, had an
impact upon the degree of respect for law in the Abu Ghraib prison . . . .”); see infra
Parts III.B, IV.B.2.a; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
71
On June 22, 2004, both the White House and the Department of Defense
released a total of twenty-eight documents regarding the Administration’s military
interrogation policies since September 11, 2001. At least six additional documents,
including the Taguba report, were leaked to the news media and are now available to
the public as well. For a complete list of all available and unavailable documents
pertaining to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions abroad as well as U.S.
military interrogation procedures, see The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S.
Policy
and
Methods
from
the
National
Security
Archive
Website,
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2005). Because the content of many of the letters and memoranda is
repetitive, only a limited number of the documents will be referenced in this Section.
72
Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee, from the Office of
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to White House Counsel Judge Alberto
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“High Contracting Party” 73 as required under Convention III.
Rather, he believed al Qaeda should be classified as a “nongovernmental terrorist organization composed of members from
many nations, with ongoing operations in dozens of nations.” 74
According to Bybee’s interpretation of Convention III, nongovernmental organizations cannot be recognized as parties to
the treaty and therefore should not be provided the protection
of its provisions. 75 Bybee also concluded that President Bush
reserved the right to suspend U.S. treaty obligations to
Afghanistan because it was a non-functioning state and the
Taliban militia was not a valid government. 76 President Bush’s
acceptance of Bybee’s determinations would effectively
accomplish two tasks.
First, the trials and long-term
detentions of al Qaeda terrorists would not be subject to
humanitarian protections under Convention III. 77 Second,
because Afghanistan constituted a “failed state,” Taliban
military personnel would also not receive POW status under
Convention III. 78
White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales agreed
with Bybee that Taliban and al Qaeda detainees should not be
afforded POW status under Convention III. In a January 25,
2002 memorandum to President Bush, Gonzales argued that
the conflict in Afghanistan did not “form[ ] the backdrop” for the
Geneva Conventions. 79 He believed that the war against
terrorism constituted a new kind of war that demanded the
procurement of valuable intelligence information from captured

Gonzales, and Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. William J. Haynes II, at 1 (Jan. 22,
2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164
(follow “Jan 22, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02]. The term
“nation-state” has been used synonymously with the term “nation.” Symposium,
Conceptions of International Peace Environmental Rights: “The Remains of the Day,” 59
TENN. L. REV. 651, 657 (1992).
73
Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 9. Convention III applies to
“all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties . . . .” Convention III, supra note 42, art. 2. A
“High Contracting Party is a country, or sovereign state, that has signed the Geneva
Conventions.” Heather Alexander, Comment, Justice for Rwanda Toward a Universal
Law of Armed Conflict, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 427, 434 n.55 (2004).
74
Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 9.
75
Id. at 10.
76
Id. at 10-11.
77
Id. at 9-10.
78
Id. at 10-11.
79
Memorandum from White House Counsel Judge Alberto R. Gonzales, to
President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/
newsweek/ (follow “January 25, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum].
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terrorists. 80 Gonzales further argued that in order to preserve
interrogation flexibility, the Geneva Conventions must be
Irrespective of the inapplicability of
rendered obsolete. 81
Convention III, Gonzales concluded that the United States
should still be “constrained” by “its commitment to treat the
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with
the principles of [Convention III].” 82 Gonzales adopted from
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the argument that the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan
but that Taliban and al Qaeda detainees should be treated in a
humane manner. 83 The negative effects resulting from the
Executive Branch’s endorsement of these two seemingly
irreconcilable viewpoints ultimately extended to the Abu
Ghraib prison facility. 84
In response to Gonzales’ memorandum, an “outraged” 85
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed his concern that
the United States had never before determined that
Convention III did not apply to an armed conflict involving its
military. 86 Powell also disagreed with Gonzales’ memorandum
insofar as it did “not squarely present to the President the
options that [were] available to him. Nor [did] it identify the
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
On January 19, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requested
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform all combatant commanders in
Afghanistan that “Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the
Department of Defense are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949” but that they should be treated “in a manner consistent
with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.” Memorandum from Sec’y of
Def., Donald Rumsfeld to the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 19, 2002),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow
“Jan 19, 2002” hyperlink). Two days later, the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
transmitted Rumsfeld’s requested message to the military commanders in Afghanistan.
See Message from the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Military Commanders
in
Afg.
(Jan.
21,
2002),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Jan 21, 2002” hyperlink); see also BRODY, supra
note 22, at 5.
84
See infra Part IV.B.2.a. See also supra notes 25 and 70 and accompanying
text.
85
Paust, supra note 20, at 826.
86
Memorandum from Sec’y of State, Colin L. Powell, to White House Counsel
and the Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs 5 (Jan. 26, 2002),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow
“Jan 26, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. See Drumbl, supra note
20, at 338 (“Secretary of State Colin Powell submitted a sharp critique of [Gonzales’]
recommendation.”).
81
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significant pros and cons of each option.” 87 Despite his deepseaed conviction that Convention III should not be limited, 88
Powell drafted his memorandum with the intent to clarify
Gonzales’ propositions. 89 In option one, Convention III would
not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan because it is a failed
state and cannot be regarded as a High Contracting Party. 90 In
option two, Convention III would apply to the conflict in
Afghanistan, but al Qaeda and Taliban detainees would
neither be afforded any protections nor be entitled to POW
status. 91 Powell preferred the latter option because option one
would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the
protections of the law of war for our troops . . . .” 92 Under both
alternatives, however, Powell embraced the Gonzales/Rumsfeld
view that all detainees should be treated in a manner
consistent with Convention III principles. 93
On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a formal
memorandum regarding the applicability of Convention III to
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, in which he made five crucial
determinations. First, Convention III does not apply to al
Qaeda primarily because it is not a High Contracting Party. 94
Second, Convention III applies to the conflict with the
Taliban, 95 but the President possesses the authority to suspend
all protections in Afghanistan at any point. 96 Third, Article 3 of
Convention III does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban
detainees because the “conflicts are international in scope
and . . . Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an
87

Powell Memorandum, supra note 86, at 1.
Id. at 1-4.
89
Id. at 1.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 2.
93
See Powell Memorandum, supra note 86, at 5.
94
See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1.
95
President Bush’s second determination is somewhat confusing. After
reviewing all four of the President’s conclusions, it can be inferred that Convention III
applies to the conflict in Afghanistan generally, but that al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees do not qualify for POW status. Id. See Human Rights Standards, supra note
40, at 275 (finding that the “President accepted application of the Geneva Conventions
in principle to the conflict with the Taliban, while asserting that Taliban personnel did
not qualify under [Convention] III for status as prisoners of war. However, the
Administration denied that the Geneva Conventions applied at all to Al Qaeda and to
the broader War on Terror, although it announced that it would adhere to comparable
humanitarian standards.”).
96
Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1-2.
88
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international character.’” 97 Fourth, Taliban detainees are
unlawful combatants and do not qualify as POWs under
Convention III. Finally, because al Qaeda is not protected
under Convention III, al Qaeda detainees do not qualify for
POW status either. 98 President Bush’s determinations created
an avenue by which Convention III did not need to be applied
to the Taliban conflict thus, “preserv[ing] maximum flexibility
with the least restraint by international law.” 99 These same
determinations led some military personnel stationed at Abu
Ghraib to improperly conclude that they could deny Geneva
law protections to a number of their detainees as well. 100
B.

Authorized Interrogation Tactics in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo Bay

After President Bush determined that the Geneva
Conventions do not protect al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, a
series of memoranda 101 circulated throughout the White House,
Department of Defense and Department of Justice regarding
the implementation of interrogation procedures in Afghanistan
A number of these documents
and Guantanamo Bay. 102
addressed whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 103 the statutes
that criminalize the commission of torture by U.S. citizens on
foreign soil, could impede the military’s ability to employ harsh
interrogation methods abroad. Both the Department of Justice
and the White House expressed the view that even if specific
interrogation methods violated the United States Code, the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, could still utilize “flexible”
interrogation methods for the purpose of gaining intelligence
In
information concerning the enemy’s military plans. 104
97

Id. at 2.
Id.
99
Human Rights Standards, supra note 40, at 275.
100
See supra notes 25 and 70 and accompanying text.
101
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
102
In January 2002, the United States began sending individuals “picked up
during the armed conflict in Afghanistan” to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The naval base
located there ultimately housed over 700 detainees from forty-four countries. BRODY,
supra note 22, at 5.
103
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
104
See Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee, from the Office
of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President 31 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Aug 1, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bybee
Memorandum 8/1/02]. See also Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in
the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
98
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support of this proposition, the Department of Justice and the
White House argued that Congress lacks the authority “to set
the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the
conduct of operations during a war.” 105 The President alone is
vested with the “entire charge of hostile operations” 106 and thus
far, Congress has not interfered with this authority. 107
The Department of Justice also concluded that the
definition of torture articulated in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
only covers “extreme acts” and that there exist a number of
interrogation methods that may be regarded as cruel,
inhumane or degrading but do not technically constitute
torture. 108 Specifically, the Department of Justice concluded
that the infliction of severe mental and physical pain does not
constitute torture unless the pain is intended to have lasting
psychological effects or cause death or organ failure. 109 Under
this definition, the beating of a prisoner into unconsciousness
or the breaking of his bones would not violate federal law. 110
The Government’s analysis of domestic laws reached
high-ranking military personnel stationed in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 111 Major General Michael B. Dunlavey responded to the
Department of Justice and the White House’s discourse
regarding the President’s responsibility to adhere to the United
States Code with a request for the authorization of more
aggressive interrogation techniques at the Guantanamo Bay
naval base. 112 The Military Intelligence personnel stationed
abroad felt constrained by the procedures outlined in the Army
Considerations 21 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
documents/040403.pdf [hereinafter Working Group Report] (stating that “Congress
may no more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy
combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the
battlefield.”). This report was prepared for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld by a
group of executive branch attorneys. See Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 592.
105
Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 34-35. See Working Group
Report, supra note 104, at 21-22.
106
Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 34 (quoting Hamilton v.
Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 87 (1874)). See Working Group Report, supra note 104, at 20.
107
Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 39.
108
Id. at 46.
109
Id.
110
Peter Irons, William Howard Taft Lecture: “The Constitution Is Just a
Scrap of Paper:” Empire Versus Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2005).
111
See Memorandum from Major Gen. Michael B. Dunlavey, Dep’t of Def.,
Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Commander for the U.S. Southern
Command
(Oct.
11,
2002),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Oct 11, 2002” hyperlink).
112
Id.
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FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation Manual. 113 In light of
President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive that the Geneva
Conventions do not apply to unlawful combatants, it can be
argued that the aforementioned personnel desired a clear
policy on permissible interrogation methods as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently approved a list of
proposed interrogation techniques 114 including, but not limited
to, yelling, the use of stress positions for a maximum of four
hours, 115 deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, the use of
twenty-hour interrogations, removal of clothing, forced
grooming, using detainees’ individual phobias to induce stress
and the use of “mild, non-injurious physical contact such as
grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light
pushing.” 116 Secretary Rumsfeld later rescinded his broadbased approval for the interrogation techniques, arguing that
the methods could not be employed without “a thorough
justification” and “a detailed plan for [their] use.” 117 He
concluded by reaffirming his position that detainees must be
treated in a humane manner during interrogations. 118
Following the submission of an Executive Branch report
regarding permissible detainee interrogations in the war
against terrorism, Secretary Rumsfeld again modified the

113
The Schlesinger Report indicates that Major General Michael B.
Dunlavey’s request was a reaction “to tenacious resistance by some detainees to
existing interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army Field
Manual 34-52.” SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 35. The Army FM 34-52
Intelligence Interrogation Manual provides that the “use of force, mental torture,
threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is
prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government.”
Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 592 (quoting U.S. ARMY, INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION 34-52 ch. 1 (1987)).
114
See Action Memorandum from White House General Counsel William J.
Haynes
II
to
Sec’y
of
Def.
Donald
Rumsfeld
(Nov.
27,
2002),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow
“Dec 2, 2002” hyperlink). Secretary Rumsfeld officially approved the interrogation
methods discussed in the memorandum on December 2, 2002. Id.
115
Underneath his signature approving interrogation techniques discussed in
the November 27, 2002 Action Memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld handwrote the
following statement: “I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing [for interrogation
purposes] limited to 4 hours?” Id.
116
Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, LTC to Commander of Joint Task Force
170 (Oct. 11, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678
&reqid=3164 (follow “Oct 11, 2002” hyperlink).
117
Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld to the Commander of
the
U.S.
Southern
Command
(USSOUTHCOM)
(Jan.
15,
2003),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow
“Jan 15, 2003 – Department of Defense memo” hyperlink).
118
Id.
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approved
list
of
unlawful
combatant
interrogation
techniques. 119 Although the new techniques did not expressly
authorize the use of physical contact or other methods that
might violate international treaties and United States domestic
laws, 120 subsequent investigations revealed that many of the
same methods previously approved, but later rescinded by
Secretary Rumsfeld were actually still being utilized at
Guantanamo Bay. 121
The numerous policy changes authorized by Secretary
Rumsfeld demonstrate the government’s hesitancy to
implement a clear interrogation policy with regard to unlawful
combatants. By determining that Convention III does not
apply to unlawful combatants, yet arguing that these
individuals should still be treated in a manner consistent with
the treaty, the government created an amorphous set of
guidelines that, in effect, authorized military personnel to
haphazardly violate humanitarian standards. 122 As a result,
the long-standing assumption that the Geneva Conventions
applied to all military campaigns was eradicated. 123
Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization of coercive
interrogation methods 124 in conjunction with President Bush’s
February 7, 2002 directive that unlawful combatants be treated
in a manner consistent with Convention III caused confusion at
the Abu Ghraib prison. 125 The Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones119

See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld to Commander for
the
U.S.
Southern
Command
(USSOUTHCOM)
(April
16,
2003),
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow
“Apr 16, 2003” hyperlink).
120
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law: Executive
Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT’L.
L. 820, 828 (2004).
121
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 29 (Part II). Such techniques included
the “use of stress positions, isolation for up to thirty days, removal of clothing, and the
use of detainees’ phobias (such as the use of dogs).” Id.
122
Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 455 (finding that while “Secretary Rumsfeld
may not have specifically authorized the use of the worst tortures . . . there should be
no mistaking of how short the distance was between practices that the reservists were
authorized to engage in or thought they were authorized to engage in and the tortures
and humiliations that were in fact committed.”).
123
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
124
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125
Paust, supra note 20, at 849 (noting that some military personnel stationed
in Iraq believed that Convention III protections could be suspended and harsh
interrogation tactics utilized based on President Bush’s reasoning from his February
7th memorandum); Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 449 (“The Government’s policies were a
moral, legal, and political disaster. At worst, these rules were seen as winking at
torture. At best, they sent confusing signals to American troops and contractors
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Fay Reports conclude that the interrogation policies delineated
by Secretary Rumsfeld and employed in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo Bay were unlawfully used at Abu Ghraib. 126
These errors could have been avoided had President Bush
ensured that military personnel understood whether and how
Convention III applied to the War in Iraq. 127
IV.

ABUSES AND FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES AT THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY

Neither President Bush nor the Department of Defense
admitted to authorizing the incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib. 128
Nonetheless, a number of Military Police and Military
Intelligence personnel working at the prison engaged in
inhumane treatment and conducted unlawful interrogations of
Iraqi detainees. 129 An investigation into the policy errors at
Abu Ghraib reveals a plethora of mistakes that could have been
avoided had proper procedural safeguards been codified by
Congress.
A.

Specific Allegations and Instances of Abuse

The Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones-Fay Reports reveal
that Abu Ghraib detainees experienced “numerous incidents of
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses.” 130 While the
exact number of substantiated incidents of abuse varies in each
report, it is generally agreed that between forty-four and fiftyfive unlawful acts transpired at the prison. 131 The abuses
in . . . Iraq.”). See Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warning, NEWSWEEK
ONLINE, May 17, 2004, at ¶ 9, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/
(“Administration critics have charged that key legal decisions . . . including the White
House’s February 2002 declaration not to grant any Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters
prisoners of war status under the Geneva Convention, laid the groundwork for the
interrogation abuses . . . in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.”).
126
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note
7, at 68; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-15 (Part I).
127
See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
128
MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14 (“Bush and Rumsfeld . . . claimed
ignorance of malpractice . . . . Implicit in such a discourse was the claim that there was
no systematic deployment of torture interrogation techniques in the US army and that
sadistic acts were isolated to degraded individuals and did not reach up through the
chain of command.”).
129
See infra Part IV.A.
130
See TAGUBA REPORT supra note 6, at 16.
131
The Schlesinger Report indicates that “[o]f the 66 already substantiated
cases of abuse, eight occurred at Guantanamo, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq.
Only about one-third were related to interrogation, and two-thirds to other causes.”
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 13. In contrast, the Jones-Fay Report indicates
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occurred at the hands of individual soldiers as well as small
military groups. 132 While the Schlesinger Report does not
provide specific examples of the abuses, 133 the other two reports
convey the details of each act.
The most severe forms of abuse occurred on the night
shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib 134 and involved both physical
attacks and sexual assaults. 135
United States military
personnel exclusively operated Tiers 1A and 1B, designated for
military intelligence “holds,” while Iraqi prison guards
supervised regular prisoners in Tiers 2 through 7. 136 With
regard to physical abuse, military personnel hit, punched,
slapped and kicked detainees, 137 sometimes until they were
rendered unconscious. 138 There are also reports of military
personnel jumping on detainees’ feet and simulating electric
torture by attaching wires to naked detainees’ extremities. 139
Dogs were frequently used to frighten detainees and on at least
one occasion, to bite and severely injure a prisoner. 140 In
addition, twenty detainees died suspiciously while in U.S.
military custody, but these deaths are still under
investigation. 141
The sexual abuses at Abu Ghraib spanned from the
photographing and videotaping of naked detainees 142 to rape. 143
Other examples of abuse include forcing detainees to remain
naked for days at a time 144 as well as arranging naked male
detainees into a pyramid formation and jumping on them. 145 In
that there were forty-four incidents of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. JONES-FAY
REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).
132
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).
133
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13.
134
Id. at 43. See also Edward T. Pound & Kit R. Roane, Hell on Earth, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP ONLINE., Jul. 19, 2004, at ¶¶ 21-23, at http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/news/articles/040719/19prison.htm.
135
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II). See also TAGUBA
REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19.
136
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 74.
137
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
138
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).
139
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16-17.
140
Id. at 19.
141
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 13; MacMaster, supra note 66,
at 15 (“In November 2003, one prisoner died under torture, but interrogators, it is
alleged, were able to dispose of his body since the dead Iraqi was never entered into the
inmate control system . . . .”).
142
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
143
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).
144
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
145
Id. at 17.
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a few instances, Military Police personnel required male
detainees to masturbate themselves 146 and each other 147 while
being photographed and videotaped. At the instruction of a
Military Police guard, one naked detainee wore a dog chain
around his neck so that a female guard could pose with him for
a photograph. 148 And finally, the words “I am a Rapest” [sic]
were written on the body of a detainee accused of raping
another prisoner. 149
B.

The Causes of Abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention
Facility

The Schlesinger and Jones-Fay Reports acknowledge
that the Abu Ghraib abuses stemmed from two very different
types of improper conduct. Some military personnel harmed
detainees for sadistic and self-serving purposes. 150 Others
committed prisoner abuses either because they misinterpreted
the law dictating what interrogation and detention methods
could be employed, or because they did not know what
interrogation methods were permissible. 151 In the former
instances, military personnel intentionally committed violent
acts designed to inflict pain or embarrassment on to the
detainees. 152 In the latter instances, military personnel did not
know, for a variety of reasons, that their actions violated
Convention III. 153
1. Moral Corruption and Criminal Misconduct
Social psychologists argue that the combination of
different psychological 154 and environmental risk factors 155 can

146

Id. at 16.
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).
148
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
149
Id. The Taguba Report lists additional abuses that he “find[s] credible
based on the clarity of [the detainees’] statements and supporting evidence provided by
other witnesses.” Id. These abuses include, but are not limited to, pouring phosphoric
liquid from chemical lights on detainees, beating detainees with a broom handle and
sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and a broom stick. Id.
150
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (Part I). See also SCHLESINGER
REPORT, supra note 7, at 68.
151
See supra note 150.
152
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (Part I).
153
Id.
154
Some psychological factors to be considered include inherent personality
traits, beliefs, attitudes, and values. Emotional factors like “[a]nger, fear, and
147

2005]

CONGRESS’ RESPONSE TO THE ABU GHRAIB ABUSES

967

motivate individuals and groups to act inhumanely. 156 With
regard to environmental risk factors, Military Police personnel
at Abu Ghraib lacked sufficient training and staff support and
constantly feared attacks from enemy forces. 157 The stress of
protecting themselves from outside threats and from
potentially volatile detainees heightened the likelihood that
Military Police personnel would engage in prisoner abuses. 158
In terms of psychological factors, the widespread practice of
stripping detainees for interrogation purposes also contributed
to the prevalence of abuse at the prison. 159 Wearing clothes “is
an inherently social practice, and therefore the stripping away
of clothing may have had the unintended consequence of
dehumanizing detainees in the eyes of those who interacted
with them.” 160 The “anti-social reactions” of the Military Police
personnel demonstrate that pathological situations, like a
prison environment, can modify the behavior of seemingly
normal individuals. 161
Intentionally committed abuses can be prevented or
curtailed through the use of reactive measures, some of which
are articulated in the Interrogation Bill. 162 Having said this, it

emotional arousal can heighten the tendency to act out aggressively” as well.
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at app. G, at 4.
155
Environmental, or situational factors, such as the presence of weapons,
verbal provocation, and physical discomfort can increase the likelihood that an
individual will behave in an aggressive manner. Id.
156
In a simulated prison experiment conducted at Stanford University in
1973, twenty-four male college students were divided into two groups, prisoners and
guards. Id. at app. G, at 1. The psychologists conducting the experiment did not direct
the “guards” to behave in any specific manner towards their “prisoners,” in hopes of
determining how wartime psychological and environmental stresses can affect an
individual’s behavior. Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S.
Prison Policy: Twenty-five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 (July 1998). The study revealed that several of the “guards”
devised sadistically inventive ways to harass and degrade the prisoners, and none of
the “less actively cruel mock-guards ever intervened or complained about the abuses
they witnessed.” Id. at 709. See Ralph R. Reiland, Unlearned Prison Lessons, 64 THE
HUMANIST 18, 20-21 (2004).
157
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at app. G, at 7.
158
Id.
159
Id. According to the Schlesinger Report, stripping detainees remains a
popular military practice because it succeeds in making “detainees feel more
vulnerable and therefore more compliant with interrogations.” Id.
160
Id.
161
Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in
a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 90 (1973).
162
The Interrogation Bill requires that all interrogations “and other pertinent
interactions” between a detainee and military personnel be videotaped. Interrogation
Bill, supra note 1, at 2; see supra note 2 and accompanying text. Arguably, the fear of
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is important for the Legislature to understand that wartime
operations “carry inherent risks for human mistreatment” 163
and that laws dictating interrogation policies should perhaps
include provisions that are not limited to the punishment of
military personnel. Had all Abu Ghraib military personnel
unequivocally understood how to apply the Geneva
Conventions to the War in Iraq, then perhaps the abuses would
have been limited to isolated instances of torture that the
Interrogation Bill directly addresses and seeks to punish. 164
This, however, is not the case. Evidence suggests that in light
of the Bush administration’s suspension of the Geneva
Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, Abu Ghraib
military personnel did not understand the extent to which
Convention III protected their prisoners. 165 For this reason, the
Interrogation Bill must be revised to include sections that
require a clear Geneva Conventions policy to be announced at
the onset of every military campaign.
2. Misinterpretations of Law and Policy at Abu Ghraib
a. Application of the Geneva Conventions in Iraq
A second factor contributing to the abuses at Abu
Ghraib was general confusion among military personnel as to
what detention and interrogation techniques could be
practiced. 166 Much of this confusion stemmed from President
Bush’s failure to indicate, in light of his determinations with
regard to the War in Afghanistan, how treatment in a manner
consistent with the Geneva Conventions differs from strict
adherence to the Geneva Conventions. 167 Lacking a definitive
prisoner treatment and detention policy, the junior military
personnel who engaged in the abuses relied on their

getting caught on videotape will deter military personnel from committing violent acts
against detainees.
163
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, app. G, at 1.
164
Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 1.
165
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra
note 8, at 5 (Part 1).
167
Murphy, General International, supra note 120, at 830-31 (President Bush
quoted as saying that the “authorization I issued was that anything we did would
conform to U.S. law and would be consistent with international treaty obligations.”)
(quoting The President’s News Conference in Savannah, Georgia, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1049, 1051 (June 10, 2004)).
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supervisors’ orders at Abu Ghraib. 168 The supervisors, in turn,
based their instructions both on the authorized tactics used
during the Afghanistan conflict 169 as well as the reasoning
advanced in President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive and
accompanying advisory memoranda. 170 Thus, in order to fully
understand the misinterpretation of law and policy at Abu
Ghraib, it is important to closely examine President Bush’s
directive regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions
in Afghanistan. 171 President Bush’s lack of a clear prisoner
treatment and detention policy in Iraq, in conjunction with his
failure to provide an extensive explanation for his decision to
withhold Convention III protections to Taliban and al Qaeda
detainees, 172 contributed to Abu Ghraib military personnel
utilizing unlawful interrogation and detention techniques. 173
168
MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14 (arguing that “senior military intelligence
(MI) officers had directed or encouraged the MP guards to ‘set favourable conditions’
for interrogation by torturing and breaking down prisoners before questioning . . . .
That this system derived from the highest level [has been] confirmed . . . .”). See also
Timothy L. Burger, et al., The Scandal’s Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004, at 31
(“The MPs told investigators they [committed the abuses] because officers in the
military-intelligence unit . . . told them to ‘loosen up’ men for interrogation.”).
169
The Schlesinger Report indicates that “none of the senior leadership or
command [in Iraq] considered any possibility other than that the Geneva Conventions
applied.” SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 82. Nonetheless, “[t]he message in
the field, or the assumptions made in the field, at times lost sight of this underpinning.
[Military] [p]ersonnel familiar with the law of determinations for [Afghanistan] tended
to factor those determinations into their decision-making for military actions in Iraq.”
Id. Thus, it can be argued that although some senior military personnel understood
that the Geneva Conventions applied to military campaigns unless the President
directed otherwise, not all lower-level military officials were privy to this “assumption.”
The Taguba Report further supports this argument by finding that supervisors from
the 800th Military Police Brigade “[n]ever attempted to remind . . . [s]oldiers of the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any
steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated.” TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at
20.
170
Paust, supra note 20, at 849. While some senior military personnel
understood that the Geneva Conventions applied to the War in Iraq, President Bush’s
memoranda as well as additional documents issued by the Department of Justice led
them to believe that protections could be suspended with regard to certain detainees.
Id.
171
See generally Bush Memorandum, supra note 69.
172
Id.
173
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 14 (“[T]he changes in DoD
interrogation policies between December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003 [with regard to the
War in Afghanistan] were an element contributing to uncertainties in the [Iraq] field
as to which techniques were authorized . . . . Policies approved for use on al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees, who were not afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions,
now applied to [Abu Ghraib] detainees who did fall under the Geneva Convention[s].”).
As of yet, the Bush administration fails to acknowledge that it did not establish a clear
Geneva Convention policy in Iraq. In fact, Condoleeza Rice argued that “[t]he
problem . . . was not the President’s policies, which explicitly ruled out [detainee]
abuse, but the ‘implementation of policy.
There’s obvious confusion in the
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In the February 7 memorandum, President Bush
accepted the Department of Justice’s legal conclusion that
Convention III “[did] not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban
detainees, because . . . the relevant conflicts are international
in scope and common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict
not of an international character.’” 174 Although President Bush
did not specify which Department of Justice documents formed
the basis for this conclusion, it is likely that he was referring to
a January 22, 2002 memorandum written by Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee. 175 In the Bybee memorandum,
the Department of Justice argued that Article 3 of Convention
III refers only to civil wars that occur when the government of
a state engages in conflict with non-international armed
factions within its territory. 176 Based on President Bush’s
limited analysis of Article 3 177 and his reliance on the
Department of Justice’s legal reports, Convention III would not
apply to the crisis in Iraq. American and British forces were
sent to Iraq in March 2003 to locate and disarm weapons of
mass destruction and to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s
government. 178 The conflict was thus international from the
beginning and therefore outside the scope of Convention III’s
Article 3.
With regard to the conflict in Afghanistan, President
Bush also held that Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants
and, therefore, should not receive protections under Convention

military’ . . . not in the White House . . . but inside the military.” HERSCH, supra note
19, at 71.
174
Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2. Article 3 refers to a “case of
armed conflict not of an international character” that “occur[s] in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties.” See Convention III, supra note 42, at art. 3.
175
Immediately preceding the issuance of President Bush’s February 7, 2002
directive, Bybee submitted two memoranda to the White House and Department of
Justice. See generally Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72; Memorandum from
Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 7,
2002), http://www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/torture/bybee20702mem.html (follow “Feb
7, 2002 - Department of Justice memo” hyperlink). However, only Bybee’s January 22,
2002 memoranda addressed Article 3 of Convention III. See Bybee Memorandum
1/22/2002, supra note 72, at 5-6.
176
See Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 6. This legal conclusion
is largely based on a commentary issued in 1987. See COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 ¶ 4339 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
177
President Bush did not explain the Department of Justice’s Article 3 legal
conclusions. Rather, he merely accepted them at face value. See Bush Memorandum,
supra note 69, at 2.
178
See
Operation
Iraqi
Freedom,
Global
Security
website,
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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III. 179 Convention III provides that an individual captured
during an armed conflict must ultimately be labeled a POW, 180
an innocent, or an unprivileged belligerent. 181 Unprivileged
belligerents, such as terrorist groups, are individuals who do
not qualify for POW status, and therefore are denied all
Convention III protections. 182 While unlawful combatants are
not mentioned anywhere in Convention III, 183 individuals who
“act[] as . . . associate[s] of a terrorist organization” and who
are not entitled to POW status are typically regarded as
such. 184 Thus, it can be argued that unprivileged belligerents,
including terrorists, are unlawful combatants. 185 Nonetheless,
the current policy on unlawful combatants remains both “vague
and lacking.” 186 The terms “unlawful combatant” and “enemy

179

See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2.
POW status
is conferred on individuals who are ‘[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party
to the conflicts’ as well as ‘[m]embers of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party . . . provided that such . . . fulfill[s]’ four specific
conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly; and
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of
Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L.J. 849, 869 (2004)
(quoting, in part, Convention III, supra note 42, art. 4A). See also Chlopak, supra note
33, at 6-7.
181
Scheck, supra note 59.
182
See id.
183
Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 450.
184
Addicott, supra note 180, at 871 (quoting Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d on reh’g sub nom. Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542
U.S. 426 (2004)). See also supra note 180 and accompanying text for POW status
criteria. In his memorandum, President Bush failed to explain what characteristics
define an unlawful combatant. Instead, he briefly argued how, in light of the new war
against terrorism, the United States should rethink the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to “groups with broad, international reach [that] commit horrific acts
against innocent civilians . . . .” Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2. Thus, the
memorandum suggests that terrorists are unlawful combatants.
185
See Chlopak, supra note 33, at 7 (“‘Unlawful combatants,’ often referred to
as ‘unprivileged combatants’ [or belligerents] are those fighters who are not entitled to
the privileges of POW status.”).
186
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 81. See also Chlopak, supra
note 33, at 7 (“The U.S. government’s classification of . . . detainees as ‘unlawful
combatants’ has generated confusion and controversy.”).
180
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combatant” are frequently used interchangeably. 187 Although
case precedent suggests that both of these designations mean
the same thing, the government and the Supreme Court have
not defined either of them. 188 The Bush administration did
state that enemy combatants are individuals who
“‘support[] . . . and engag[e] in . . . armed conflict against the
United States’” 189 and who commit or plan to commit mass
However, a list of criteria used to classify
murder. 190
individuals as enemy combatants or unlawful combatants does
not appear to exist.
Because the Executive Branch characterized all
individuals who do not qualify for POW status, including
terrorists, as unlawful combatants, 191 Convention III would not
protect many Abu Ghraib detainees. In addition to searching
for weapons of mass destruction and ending Saddam Hussein’s
regime, Operation Iraqi Freedom military objectives also
included dispelling terrorists from the country and gathering
intelligence information regarding terrorist networks. 192
President Bush subsequently affirmed these objectives by
publicly referring to some Iraqis as terrorists. 193 If the threat of
terrorism served as one of the Government’s primary rationales
in denying Taliban detainees protection under Convention
III, 194 then it is only logical to conclude that military personnel
might assume that Iraqi detainees charged with offenses

187

See Addicott, supra note 180, at 871 (quoting Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at

593).
188

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (“There is some debate as
to the proper scope of th[e] term [‘enemy combatant’], and the Government has never
provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as
such.”).
189
Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 3).
190
Edward Greer, “We Don’t Torture People in America”: Coercive
Interrogation in the Global Village, 26(3) NEW POL. SCI. 371, 382-83 (Sept. 2004)
(quoting President Bush in Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Bush Defends Secret
Tribunals for Terrorism Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A28).
191
See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
192
See Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Security Website, supra note 178.
193
See Transcript: President Bush Holds Post-G-8 Summit News Conference
(June 10, 2004), at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32143-2004June10.html
(President Bush admitting to calling some individuals situated in Iraq “terrorists” and
“killers.”).
194
Paust, supra note 20, at 812 (“A common plan to violate customary and
treaty-based international law concerning the treatment and interrogation of so-called
‘terrorist’ and enemy combatant detainees and their supporters captured during the
U.S. war in Afghanistan emerged within the Bush Administration in 2002.”).
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against the United States would not be protected under the
same Convention either. 195
The most confusing aspect of President Bush’s February
7, 2002 memorandum, however, is his espousal for the humane
treatment of all detainees, including unlawful combatants. 196
President Bush acknowledged that while certain prisoners may
not qualify for protection under the Geneva Conventions, they
should still be treated in a manner consistent with the treaties’
principles. 197 Only in instances of “military necessity” could the
torture or inhumane treatment of detainees be authorized. 198
Despite President Bush’s asserted commitment to upholding
the Conventions’ provisions, the Department of Defense
approved numerous coercive and arguably inhumane
interrogation tactics for use in the war against terrorism. 199
Thus,
while
“[t]he
President . . . spoke
out
against
torture, . . . his equivocations on the terms of [Convention III]
suggest that he perceive[d] wiggle room between ideal and
practice.” 200 In essence, the Executive Branch authorized a new
and unmanageable Geneva Conventions policy that instilled a
tremendous amount of discretionary power to military
personnel. In an effort to eradicate terrorism, President Bush
created an outlet for unrestrained abuse that ultimately
resurfaced at the Abu Ghraib prison one year later. 201
The inclusion of the “military necessity” clause in
President Bush’s directive served as an exception that
“swallow[ed] the rule.” 202 According to government officials,
military necessity suspends the application of Geneva
Convention principles when “force protection,” or conduct
necessary to protect U.S. troops, is required. 203 This definition
of the exception appears to be mischaracterized. Government
195
Iraqi prisoners charged with offenses against their countrymen were under
the supervision of Iraqi soldiers. From this fact, it can be inferred that those detainees
under the supervision of US military personnel in Tiers 1A and 1B were charged with
offenses against the United States. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 74.
196
See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
200
Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu Ghraib, THE ATLANTIC, July 2004, at 40.
201
See supra notes 25, 70 and 125 and accompanying text.
202
See Press Briefing, supra note 67. Edward Greer argues that “[w]hat
constitutes military necessity under this scheme is merely the unilateral decision of the
Executive itself – a far cry from the specific legal constraints set forth in the
Conventions.” Greer, supra note 190, at 379.
203
See Press Briefing, supra note 67.
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interest in preventing another September 11-type attack
against the United States prompted the White House and the
Department of Justice to find valid reasons to suspend
Convention III protections to Taliban and al Qaeda
detainees. 204 Although President Bush encouraged detainees to
be treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva
Conventions, he acknowledged an overwhelming need to
provide military personnel with the means to successfully
procure information from suspected terrorists regarding
The military necessity clause
possible future attacks. 205
achieved this purpose by serving as a license to deviate from
Convention III principles when the lives of innocent American
civilians, not just U.S. troops, might be at stake. Thus, by
discretely incorporating the necessity exception into the
memorandum, President Bush arguably strived to accomplish
two dichotomous tasks: to provide the United States military
with the flexibility to conduct coercive interrogations abroad 206
and to maintain an honorable reputation within the
international humanitarian rights community. 207
204

See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 79.

[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war. It is not the traditional
clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop
for [Convention III]. The nature of the new war places a high premium on
other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured
terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against
American civilians, and the need to try terrorists for war crimes such as
wantonly killing civilians.
Id. See also Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1.
[T]he war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups
with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent
civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our Nation recognizes
that this new paradigm – ushered in not by us, but by terrorists – requires
new thinking in the law of war . . . .
Id.; Greer, supra note 190, at 372.
205
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
206
Human Rights Standards, supra note 40, at 275 (“The purposes of this
interpretation [of the Geneva Conventions with regard to the War in Afghanistan] were
to preserve maximum flexibility with the least restraint by international law and to
immunize government officials from prosecution under the War Crimes Act . . . .”);
Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 453 (“Concerned with the need to acquire as much
‘actionable intelligence’ as possible, by whatever means, the [Bush] Administration
adopted a strategy to permit something close to unfettered power in dealing with
terrorist suspects.”).
207
See Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers
and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 (2004) (finding that “[a] nation’s reputation for
decency and respect for law is a vital national asset that can strongly affect its
influence and leadership.”).
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The effect of President Bush’s military necessity
exception in conjunction with his support for the humane
treatment of all detainees created vast confusion at the Abu
Ghraib detention facility. 208 While it might be customary for
military officials to assume that the Geneva Conventions apply
to all international conflicts unless otherwise informed, 209
President Bush apparently complicated this issue.
The
February 7, 2002 memorandum drew a distinction between
behaving in a manner consistent with Convention III principles
and strictly abiding by these principles. In light of this
development in military policy, the President’s request that
military personnel in Iraq treat their detainees humanely could
no longer be viewed as a direct order to abide by the Geneva
Conventions.
b. Difficulty Applying Convention III Principles:
Inadequate Training and the Unlawful
Migration of Interrogation Methods
Assuming that Abu Ghraib military personnel
understood that the Geneva Conventions applied to Iraq,
inadequate training and the migration of interrogation
methods from Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay contributed
to the treaty’s failed application. 210 The Jones-Fay Report
indicates that “[d]espite the emphasis on the Geneva
Conventions, it is clear from the results at Abu Ghraib . . . that
Soldiers on the ground are confused about how they apply the
Geneva Conventions . . . .” 211 To demonstrate this fact, the
report argues that Military Police and Military Intelligence
personnel did not receive training on interrogation techniques
such as sleep adjustment, isolation, segregation, environmental
adjustment, dietary manipulation, the use of military dogs, and
the removal of clothing. 212 Furthermore, upon their arrival into
Iraq, U.S. soldiers received a mere thirty-six minutes of general
human rights training at the Joint Interrogation & Debriefing
208

See supra notes 25, 70 and 125 and accompanying text.
Press Briefing, supra note 67 (White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
arguing that “soldiers are trained from day one in their service to apply [the] Geneva
[Conventions] . . . . [T]hat’s . . . the default position . . . that Geneva is going to apply.”).
210
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20, 22, 26, 43-45; SCHLESINGER
REPORT, supra note 7, at 14, 44; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-16 (Part I);
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19, 114 (Part II).
211
See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (Part II).
212
Id.
209
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Center (JIDC). 213 While insufficient training undoubtedly
increased the frequency and severity of the abuses, none of the
reports acknowledge the more fundamental problem that the
implementation of the aforementioned interrogation techniques
arguably violated Convention III principles. 214 Accordingly, in
addition to improper training, abuses occurred at Abu Ghraib
because military personnel did not understand the basic
principles of Convention III, including what constitutes
“outrages upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and
degrading treatment.” 215 Without a comprehensive knowledge
of the treaty’s provisions, Abu Ghraib military personnel
became more likely to commit unauthorized abuses. 216
The migration of interrogation techniques from
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay to Abu Ghraib also
contributed to military personnel’s confusion regarding the
breadth and content of Convention III principles.
In
September 2003, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller,
Commander at Guantanamo Bay, conducted a review of the
interrogation methods employed in Iraq. 217 In his report, Miller
concluded that “[i]t is essential that the guard force be actively
engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of
the internees,” adding that the regime at Abu Ghraib would
help create a “synergy between [Military Police] and [Military
Intelligence] resources . . . .” 218 Accordingly, Miller submitted
213
Steven H. Miles, Abu Ghraib: Its Legacy for Military Medicine, 364 LANCET
725, 726 (Aug. 21, 2004). Major General Taguba, however, found that 372nd Military
Police Batallion and the 372nd Military Police Company received no training on
detention procedures and that very little training was provided to Military Police
personnel regarding Convention III. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20.
214
Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 455.
[Although] Secretary Rumsfeld may not have specifically authorized the use
of the worst tortures . . . there should be no mistaking of how short the
distance was between practices that the reservists were authorized to engage
in or thought they were authorized to engage in and the tortures and
humiliations that were in fact committed. The administration authorized the
use of dogs, the administration authorized the stripping naked of prisoners,
the administration authorized exploiting Islamic concerns for modesty, the
administration authorized the causing of physical pain. In Iraq, these
procedures were ultimately used against a population that America claimed
to be liberating.
Id.
215
See Convention III, supra note 42, at art. 3. See also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
216
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
217
MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14.
218
GEOFFREY MILLER, ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM
INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 6 (2003), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/a20.pdf.
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recommendations to Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the
senior military commander in Iraq, regarding the possible
implementation of interrogation techniques utilized in
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. 219 Although conflicting
reports exist as to whether Miller warned Sanchez that the
suggested interrogation tactics violated Convention III,
Sanchez accepted his recommendations and distributed a
memo to Abu Ghraib Military Intelligence officers that
ultimately formed the basis for a set of coercive interrogation
guidelines. 220
In addition to Sanchez’s memorandum, unlawful
questioning also became institutionalized through “word of
mouth” techniques passed to Abu Ghraib military personnel
from assistant teams in Guantanamo Bay. 221 What little
understanding of the Geneva Conventions Abu Ghraib soldiers
possessed after their JIDC training diminished considerably
following the migration of interrogation techniques from
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. The methods advanced by
Miller and other military personnel stationed in Afghanistan
and Cuba arguably violated Convention III principles. 222 At the
very least, introducing these techniques to soldiers stationed in
Iraq created a misimpression as to what interrogation
techniques
satisfied
Convention
III’s
humanitarian
requirements.
The Jones-Fay Report suggests that “interrogation is an
art . . . and knowing the limits of authority is crucial.” 223 Abu
Ghraib military personnel did not understand how to comply
with Convention III principles, in large part, because of
President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive. 224 America’s “war
on terror” provided the Bush Administration with a
justification to create an ambiguous Geneva Conventions
219
Mark Mazzetti, et al., Inside the Iraq Prison Scandal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP ONLINE., May 24, 2004, at ¶¶ 2-3, 9, 14, at http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/news/articles/040524/24leadall_5.htm.
220
Paust, supra note 20, at 847-48. The guidelines allowed for “sleep
deprivation, forcing prisoners into ‘stress’ positions for up to 45 minutes, and
threatening them with guard dogs.” Mazzetti, supra note 219, at ¶ 9.
221
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).
222
See Working Group Report supra note 104, at 2A-2B (stating that the
interrogation techniques authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld raised “major issue[s] in
[the] area of consideration that cannot be eliminated” with regard to international
treaties and United States domestic laws). See also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
223
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).
224
See supra notes 25 and 125 and accompanying text.
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policy. 225 The directive’s “military necessity” exception enabled
military personnel to circumvent the Geneva Conventions
when national security might be at issue. 226 By establishing an
exception to the Geneva Conventions, the Bush Administration
effectively ignored international humanitarian rights
standards and formed an outlet for detainee abuse. 227 With
regard to the War in Iraq, President Bush never formally
indicated that the Geneva Conventions did, in fact, apply. 228
And even if Abu Ghraib military personnel correctly assumed
that detainees qualified for full protection under Convention
III, it still remained unclear whether the “military necessity”
exception carried over from Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.
Accordingly, Abu Ghraib military personnel followed their
predecessors’ example and utilized interrogation methods
unlawful under the Geneva Conventions. 229
After reviewing the facts and circumstances
surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison atrocity, it becomes clear
that the Bush Administration’s failure to implement a clear
Convention III policy in Iraq ignited a chain of events that led
to the abuse of numerous detainees. 230 Accordingly, a strategy
must be devised to prevent additional wartime human rights
violations. Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill attempts to
achieve this goal by proposing a series of deterrent measures,
designed to address individualized instances of abuse. 231 A
more effective bill, however, would focus on remedying the
underlying policy problems that initially facilitated the
prisoner abuse.

225

Greer, supra note 190, at 372 (“Since September 11, 2001 . . . torture has
been the practice and de facto policy of the Bush administration . . . as a core means of
conducting the so-called ‘war on terror.’”). “It’s not that the United States has any
particular interest in egregious human rights violations. It’s just that it’s a natural
corollary to what it is interested in, and to how you achieve goals like that.” NOAM
CHOMSKY, POWER AND TERROR: POST-9/11 TALKS AND INTERVIEWS 48 (2003).
226
See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
227
The February 7, 2002 memorandum “is potentially one of the broadest
putative excuses for violations of Geneva law.” Paust, supra note 20, at 828.
MacMaster, supra note 66, at 4 (stating that “international law makes it clear that
protection from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by the state is not negotiable
or open to derogation.”).
228
See supra notes 22 and 24 and accompanying text.
229
See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
230
Equally troubling, the Bush Administration has not yet issued a new order
directing compliance with the Geneva Conventions in Iraq. The order that “merely
Geneva ‘principles’ should be applied and then only if ‘appropriate’ and if ‘consistent
with military necessity’” still governs. Paust, supra note 20, at 854.
231
See generally Interrogation Bill, surpa note 1.
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V.

PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON
ABUSES: ERADICATE MISINTERPRETATIONS OF LAW AND
POLICY WITHIN THE MILITARY

Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill serves as a
strong preliminary response to a complicated controversy.
Section One directs the President to order the videotaping of
interrogations and “other pertinent interactions” of detainees
in the custody of the United States armed forces as well as
intelligence operatives and contractors of the United States. 232
Section Two requires the President to “take such actions as are
necessary” to ensure that human rights organizations are
granted “unfettered access” to detainees in the custody of the
United States. 233 Finally, Section Three requires that the
Judge Advocate General develop guidelines that are
“sufficiently expansive to prevent any abuse of detainees” that
violates “law binding on the United States, including
[international] treaties.” 234
In general, the Interrogation Bill’s provisions are
designed to prevent future abuses through the use of effective
scare tactics. By requiring the videotaping of interrogations
and “other pertinent actions” 235 between a detainee and United
States military personnel, it is expected that soldiers will
refrain from committing inhumane acts for fear of getting
caught. The same rationale applies with regard to granting the
United Nations and other human rights organizations
unfettered access to all detention facilities. 236 Unannounced
and spontaneous detention facility visits by human rights
organizations increases the probability that more human rights
abuses will be discovered, and as a consequence, disobedient
military personnel will be punished.
The attractiveness of the bill’s simple logic, however,
does not outweigh its many defects.
For example, the
Interrogation Bill’s videotape and unfettered access
requirements do not address the problem that many Abu
Ghraib military did not understand the applicability of
Convention III to the crisis in Iraq, including its breadth and

232
233
234
235
236

Id. § 1.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 1.
Id. § 2.
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scope. 237 These problems emanated from the White House’s
failure to establish a coherent Geneva Conventions policy
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 238 The Executive Branch’s
ambiguity in this respect led to the military’s reliance on
detention operations and interrogation techniques utilized
during the War in Afghanistan. 239 The success of the bill’s
videotape and unfettered access requirements largely depends
upon military personnel’s understanding of what acts fail to
comply with the Geneva Conventions. Although some U.S.
soldiers stationed in Iraq knew that their behavior violated the
Geneva Conventions, 240 others employed coercive interrogation
tactics because they believed the Executive Branch had
sanctioned them. 241 As written, the Interrogation Bill only
addresses the former group of military personnel.
Its
deterrence measures are contingent upon soldiers’ awareness
of the treaty’s applicability. And because one cannot be
deterred from engaging in acts that he or she does not know
violate Convention III, the Interrogation Bill fails to achieve its
designated purpose.
Thus, in order to prevent another Abu Ghraib atrocity,
Congress must focus on remedying the fundamental policy and
interpretation of law errors that existed at the detention
facility. Accordingly, a more effective bill proposal would direct
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to clearly indicate to
military personnel at the onset of every international conflict to
what extent detainees should be treated in accordance with the
Geneva Conventions. 242 In order to accomplish this task, the
237

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.B.ii.a.
239
See supra Part IV.B.ii.a-b.
240
See supra Part IV.B.i.
241
See supra Part IV.B.ii.a-b.
242
Any congressional attempt to dictate military policy will always raise
Separation of Power concerns. As Commander-in-Chief, the President enjoys the broad
authority to exclusively control all war operations. See supra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text. See also Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 87 (1874) (“the President
alone . . . is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations.”).
However, some scholars have contended that the “power to regulate the treatment of
wartime detainees is shared between the legislative and executive branches.” Jinks &
Sloss, supra note 18, at 172. When “the United States ratifies a treaty that constrains
the President’s operational discretion [i.e., Convention III], that treaty ratification
empowers Congress to regulate in areas where it could not otherwise regulate.” Id. at
176. Specifically, under the Constitution’s Define and Punish and Necessary and
Proper Clauses, Congress possesses the power to regulate “matters governed by [a]
treaty, even if those matters would otherwise be subject to the President’s exclusive
power.” Id. at 179. Moreover, the Government and Regulation Clause also grants
Congress “the power to prescribe rules for the treatment of wartime detainees . . . .” Id.
238
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bill must require the President to: (1) assess whether the
warring state qualifies as a “High Contracting Party” under
Article 4 of Convention III; 243 (2) assess whether the armed
conflict is “not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” under Article
3 of Convention III; 244 (3) define “unlawful combatant” and
assess whether the enemy force should not receive protection
under Convention III because it qualifies as such; and (4)
obtain congressional approval before attempting to violate any
or all Convention III articles. 245
The incorporation of the aforementioned provisions into
the Interrogation Bill address the underlying policy problems
that gave rise to the Abu Ghraib prison abuses. Sections One
and Two prevent the President from assuming that military
personnel understand that Convention III always applies to
instances of armed conflict unless otherwise informed. This
task is accomplished by requiring the President to discern the
applicability of Convention III to military campaigns using the
treaty’s own language. In effect, a formal analysis process will
compel the President to establish a clear Convention III policy,
thus reducing the possibility of future confusion among lowlevel military personnel stationed abroad.
Section Three responds to the ambiguity arising from
President Bush’s use of the term “unlawful combatant” in his
February 7, 2002 directive. 246 In order to prevent this term
from being employed as a broad-based exception to the Geneva
Conventions, a list of criteria defining unlawful or enemy
combatant must be created. After formulating a definition,
President Bush may use it as an additional tool to assist him in
delineating a clear Geneva Conventions policy at the onset of
every military campaign. Section Three, however, cannot be
read in a vacuum. If the President determines that certain
detainees are unlawful combatants, he cannot deny protection

at 175. Under this clause, it can be argued that “the vast majority of the provisions
embodied in the Geneva Conventions address matters that are well within the scope of
Congress’s . . . [p]ower.” Id. at 175. Because this Note’s proposed modifications deal
exclusively with the President’s compliance with Convention III, it can be argued that
they do not exceed the scope of legislative supervision and do not infringe upon the
Executive Branch’s Article II powers.
243
See Convention III, supra note 42, art. 4.
244
Id. art. 3.
245
See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 106.
246
Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2.
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under the Geneva Conventions without Congress’ express
approval as articulated in Section Four. 247
Section Four refutes the Bush Administration’s position
that the President can unilaterally violate 248 Convention III
provisions to protect national security. 249 Even if a presidential
action can be justified on “national security grounds” (e.g.,
denying Geneva Conventions protections to suspected enemy
combatants for the purposes of procuring important
intelligence information), the action “may [still] impose
significant constraints on personal liberty.” 250 In order to
prevent discretionary abuse and “‘conciliate the confidence of
the [American] people,’” 251 Congress must be able to prescribe
guidelines for the treatment of wartime detainees so long as
they do not interfere with the President’s control over
Accordingly, Executive branch
battlefield operations. 252
directives regarding the possible violation of Convention III
protections are subject to legislative review. 253 This rule does
not undermine the Executive Branch’s Commander-in-Chief
Power with regard to law-of-war treaties. On the contrary, the
President may still suspend and terminate treaties so long as
such actions are made in accordance with the treaties’ terms. 254
In effect, Section Four strengthens the government’s
commitment to upholding humanitarian rights standards by
requiring the Executive Branch to gain congressional
authorization before breaching any of the United States’ treaty
obligations. It places a check on the President’s ability to
247

Some scholars contend that even if a prisoner is deemed an unlawful
combatant, thereby rendering Convention III inapplicable, the prisoner should still be
afforded protection under Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 101. Accordingly, to deprive the
prisoner any form of protection would be a violation of the treaty, which is
impermissible without congressional approval. Id. at 102, 146-47.
248
It is important to note that there is a difference between “treaty
termination” and “treaty suspension” or “violation.” International law principles
enable “parties to a treaty [to] jointly terminate a treaty either by consent of all the
parties or by concluding a later treaty. A state may unilaterally terminate or suspend
the operation of a treaty in response to a material breach by another party.” Id. at 154.
Furthermore, a state may also “invoke ‘the impossibility of performing a treaty,’ or ‘[a]
fundamental change of circumstances’ as a ground for terminating . . . the operation of
a treaty.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
249
Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 102, 146-47.
250
Id. at 153.
251
Id. at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)).
252
See id. at 175.
253
See id. at 164, 172-73.
254
See id. at 163.
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violate Convention III protections when Congress questions his
reasons for wanting to do so. In light of President Bush’s
suspension of Convention III protections to al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees and its repercussions in Iraq, this Section
serves to prevent detainee abuses and to rehabilitate the
government’s reputation within the international human rights
community.
The incorporation of the aforementioned provisions into
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill provides a
comprehensive response to the Abu Ghraib prison abuses.
Representative Holt proposes deterrent measures that can only
prevent additional abuses if military personnel understand the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions as well as the breadth
and scope of the treaty’s protections. 255 The four additional
provisions introduced and analyzed in this Note, however,
address the fundamental policy problems that originated in the
Executive Branch during the War in Afghanistan and that
existed during Operation Iraqi Freedom as well. Specifically,
Sections One, Two, and Three ensure that soldiers will no
longer be confused about the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions during military campaigns in light of President
Bush’s ambiguous February 7, 2002 directive. Section Four, on
the other hand, prevents the President from violating the
Geneva Conventions without congressional authorization.
Compliance with Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill
might result in the apprehension of a handful of transgressors.
Adherence to this Note’s proposals, however, ensures that the
number of broad-based policy problems confronting military
personnel at Abu Ghraib and other prison facilities will be
minimized.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Confusion regarding the applicability of Convention III
at the Abu Ghraib prison can largely be attributed to the
development of expansive military policies after the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. What began as an attempt by the
Bush Administration to protect national security through the
procurement of vital intelligence information during the
Afghanistan conflict became a means to commit unsanctioned
abuses in Iraq. By not clearly limiting his February 7, 2002
directive to the War in Afghanistan, President Bush left open
255

See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text.
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for interpretation whether many Iraqi detainees should not be
afforded Convention III protections. Moreover, those military
personnel that did understand Convention III’s applicability in
Iraq undoubtedly misinterpreted the treaty’s provisions after
becoming privy to the coercive interrogation methods utilized
in both Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.
In light of these fundamental problems, Congress must
introduce a bill that not only seeks to apprehend and punish
transgressors, but that prevents the Executive Branch from
creating
ambiguous
detainee
treatment
policies.
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill serves as a solid
foundation.
The bill’s videotape and unfettered access
requirements arguably will prevent military personnel who
understand Convention III’s applicability and protections from
committing unauthorized abuses. Nonetheless, because a
number of U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq either did not
understand Convention III’s applicability or did not
understand the breadth and scope of the treaty’s protections,
additional provisions are needed to prevent another Abu
Ghraib atrocity.
Accordingly, this Note’s proposed
modifications require the Executive Branch to delineate clear
Convention III guidelines at the onset of every military
campaign and limit its ability to violate the treaty’s articles.
The incorporation of such provisions will hopefully reduce the
number and magnitude of future detainee abuses and assist in
the rebuilding of our government’s reputation within the
international humanitarian rights community. Moreover, such
a law should still be passed even if it cannot take effect until
after U.S. troops pull out of Iraq. In light of the government’s
“war on terror,” it is conceivable that other countries might be
invaded in the near future. Congress must not lose sight of
this fact and continue to work towards preventing prisoner
abuses, not just in Iraq, but in all subsequent military
campaigns.
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